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HAS A TRIAL JUDGE OF A UNITED STATES
COURT THE RIGHT TO DIRECT A
VERDICT
It is the purpose of this article to enquire into the origin of a
practice that since about I85o has obtained in trial courts of the
United States, whereby the judge, when he deems it proper,
directs the jury as to the verdict they shall render. We would
ascertain whether this be a correct practice. Is it not open to the
objection, that it conflicts with the requirements of the Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution? The question is of immediate
importance to a practitioner in the Federal Courts. Moreover, it
cannot fail to interest a student of the Constitution, all the more
so, since this particular amendment has seldom been brought
before the courts for construction.
Let us begin with observing that the practice of directing a
verdict is of modern development. It was not known to the com-
mon law. Indeed, it had never been heard of at the date when
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution was adopted.
Directing a verdict came into being as the result of experience
in the trial of jury cases in State courts. Those courts discarded
the demurrer to evidence as not suited to a speedy disposition of
cases. In its place they adopted the directing of a verdict, which
was considered as practically amounting to the same thing. It
seems that courts of the United States have followed this action
of the State courts without paying attention to the question
whether they were free so to do. Indeed, nobody appears to
have raised an objection until recently, that directing a verdict
is a proceeding in violation of the Constitution.:
The language of the seventh amendment is familiar to the
reader. It is as follows:
"In suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved; and no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law."
The point was taken before the Supreme Court of the United States
in an application for a writ of certiorari at the October Term, 1913. The
question was not presented, however, in such form as to obtain a ruling
and an opinion of the Court thereon. Allegar v. American Car Foundry
CoMpaty, 231 U. S. 747.
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The amendment, it will be recalled, was adopted (1789-91) as
the result of political considerations of the highest importance.
While the circumstances attending its origin are familiar history,
we may with profit resort to them in order to view in a true light
the amendment itself. Mr. justice Story, in his treatise upon
the Constitution, narrates these circumstances with fullness.
Speaking of the alarm that the people felt on reading the clause
that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as
to law and fact, he quotes at length the argument set forth in
the Federalist, No. 8i, and says:
"These views, however reasonable they may seem to
considerate minds, did not wholly satisfy the popular
opinion; and as the objection has a vast influence upon
public opinion, and amendments were proposed by various
State conventions on this subject, Congress at its first
session, under the guidance of the friends of the Consti-
tution, proposed an amendment [the seventh] which was
ratified by the people, and is now incorporated into the
Constitution. . . . It weakened the opposition by taking
away one of the strongest points of attack upon the Con-
stitution." 2
Patrick Henry, in an unsparing attack made in the Virginia
convention upon the proposed Constitution, exclaimed:
"This will in its operation destroy the trial by jury.
The verdict of an impartial jury will be reversed by
judges unacquaifited with the circumstances." 3
In the North Carolina convention, Spencer denounced, in a like
strain, the omission of a jury clause for civil cases. He declared
that "our rights and liberties" are "endangered.1
4
One objection, of no little force, was urged, that the judges
would sit at a distance from the locality where the jury had acted.
Lack of ready communication in those times operated to intensify
that undefined dread which a party to a suit experiences at the
thought that a bench of judges, in some far off place, may fail
to recognize his rights. The tone and tenor of the movement to
secure a declaration by amendment of the right to a trial by
jury, was manifested in a determined opposition to any inter-
ference on the part of the appellate judges with the result reached
' Story on the Constitution, Sec. 1768.
92 Elliott's Debates, 395.
43 Elliott's Debates, 396.
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by a jury in their verdict, save as such interference was allowed
by the common law rules of practice, in the shape of a bill of
exceptions, dealing with such facts only as appeared on the
record.
The amendment aimed to continue a system then in vogue by
which errors of law were corrected. It declared that the rules
of the common law should remain permanent as a protection to
the rights.of parties to an action at law. That such was its pur-
pose appears, not only from a natural interpretation of the words
themselves, but from the language of early commentators on the
Constitution, who, it is plain to see, were expressing views which
the judges and the bar entertained not many years after the
amendment had gone into effect.
Says Rawle, in 1829 (quoting the amendment):
"By the first part of it, Congress is disabled from ever
taking it away; and by the second, neither a law can be
passed by them, nor a practice adopted by the courts, to
re-examine facts tried by a jury, otherwise than according
to well-known and established principles." (P. I35.)
Says Bayard, in 1833:
"The latter part of it is to prevent the infringement of
this right by the judges taking upon themselves in any
case the power to decide upon matters of fact which have
been settled by a jury." (p. i4o.)
We are to discover the meaning of the words "a fact tried by
a jury," and the "rules of the common law," by reverting to the
period when the amendment took effect. What did the framers
of the amendment intend? They intended to make certain and
unchangeable the terms of a practice. No matter what the future
might require, the rules of the common law, precisely as they
stood in that day, should govern another court in the mode of
re-examining a fact found by a jury. The people were vigilant
that no ericroachment be attempted by a court upon the province
of the jury. The right to a trial by jury in civil causes they
clung to as a right peculiarly their own. Here in the plainest
terms they provide that this right shall never be impaired, so
long as the amendment remains in force.
At that day our population was almost exclusively of Anglo-
Saxon stock. Nearly every man felt himself well fitted to sit
upon a jury. As freemen, they held the jury system in a yen-
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eration no less profound than had their English ancestors. One
principle there was to which they tenaciously adhered. It may
be expressed in general terms to the effect that the jury alone
shall decide questions of fact. A judge, in submitting a case,
may express his opinion upon the evidence, but that which was to
be found as an ultimate fact, because drawn by proper inference
from the testimony, should remain solely for the jury to
determine. In order to maintain this right in its integrity the
amendment provided that the rules of the common law should
govern the re-examination of a fact tried by a jury. The power
of the appellate court is confined strictly within these rules.
Re-examination according to the common law rules might be
made by the trial judge, upon a motion for a new trial; or, by an
appellate court, upon a record brought before them, by a writ
allowed for alleged errors of law committed by the judge at the
trial. The expression, "the rules of the common law" means the
rules of the common law of England, and not the rules of that
law as modified by local statute, or usage, in any of the States.5
The opinion by Mr. Justice Gray in the case of Capital Trac-
tion Co. v. Hof, discusses the subject of trial by jury, and
defines with precision the scope of the amendment now under
examination:
"It must therefore be taken as established, by virtue of
the seventh amendment of the Constitution that either
party to an action at law (as distinguished from suits in
equity or in admiralty), in a court of the United States,
where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars,
has the right to a trial by jury; that when a trial by jury
has been had in an action at law, in a court, either of the
United States, or of a State, the facts there tried and
decided cannot be re-examined in any court of the
United States, otherwise than according to the rules of
the common law of England; that by the rules of that
law, no other mode of re-examination is allowed than upon
a new trial, either granted by the court in which the first
trial was had, or to which the record was returnable, or
ordered by an appellate court for error in law; and there-
fore, that unless a new trial has been granted in one of
these two ways, facts once tried by a jury cannot be tried
anew, by a jury or otherwise, in any court of the United
States."6
Per Mr. justice GRAY. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 147 U. S. 8.
'Supra, p. 13.
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. Not without significance is it that in the seventh amendment
the phrase "common law" is twice used. It is as if to declare
that the then practice, which had been settled by the established
rules of the common law, must not be departed from. A domi-
nating purpose we perceive is the preservation of the right of
trial by jury; relying, as a means thereof, upon the maintenance
of the rules of the common law, which at that period were gov-
erning the procedure whereby errors in trial courts could be
corrected, either by the court itself, or by an appellate tribunal.
In a word, the right of a trial by jury is to be preserved by a
stability of procedure.
The words are plain. There is little need of interpretation.
In announcing their true meaning we do well to recall to mind
the observations of an eminent jurist who made the Constitution a
special subject of study and reflection:
"This court has held in many instances that a constitu-
tional provision intended for the protection of rights of
private property should be liberally construed."7
The protection which the seventh amendment aims to establish
against any action by a court in the direction of reviewing the
whole evidence, after a jury has given a verdict, is an end so
gravely important that one may well ask with what fidelity have
judges obeyed the injunction.
Testimony found admissible at the trial of an action at law
could be disposed of in two ways, according to the rules of the
common law. The most common method (indeed, it was used
almost exclusively) was to submit the testimony to the jury, sub-
ject to instructions from the judge as to points of law applicable
thereto. Such testimony as the judge had considered inad-
missible was withheld from the jury, and an exception allowed
to a party, if asked for. In like manner, if a judge admitted
testimony against an objection, the party took his exception. The
spirit of the rules favored the submission to the jury of all rele-
vant testimony, leaving it to them to treat it as proving or dis-
proving an alleged fact.
An error of law in the judge's ruling was noted on his minutes,
upon the taking of an exception. The exception presented a
question of law. The Statute of Westminster 2 (13 Edw. i)
gave to a party as his privilege a right to a bill of exceptions,
'Per FIELD, J., dissenting in Munn v. Illinoi, 94 U. S. 134.
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which right could be enforced, should the judge refuse to sign
and seal the bill. Only so much evidence could be set out in the
bill as was needful to explain the bearings of the judge's ruling
upon matters of law in reference to the particular question in
dispute."
The rules of the common law did not permit the entire evidence
to be sent up to the appellate court in a bill of exceptions, for
that would be to substitute that tribunal for the jury in
determining questions of fact at issue. Upon extremely rare
occasions it may have happened that all the evidence, it being
very brief, was sent up, in order that the appellate court might
be informed of the meaning of the exception. But the rule was
strict that the evidence was always to be treated as incidental to a
point of law.
The lawyers who framed the seventh amendment knew per-
fectly well of the existence of this restriction. A chief purpose
in forbidding re-examination was to ensure against possible
future legislation by Congress assuming to authorize an appel-
late court of the United States to examine the entire evidence
after a jury had passed upon it.9
'See Grand Trunk Railway Company v. Ives, 144 U. S. 414.
'The reader who is curious to learn what regard is paid by courts of
the United States to the inhibition of the Seventh Amendment in respect
to re-examining a fact found by a jury may turn to Flannelly v. Delaware
& Hudson Ca., (1912) 225 U. S. 597. He will find that two appellate
courts, one after the other, have here re-examined in a manner not in
accordance with the rules of common law a fact tried by a jury. Action
to recover damages because of the negligence of a railroad company, at a
grade crossing, where the vehicle of the plaintiff was destroyed, and the
plaintiff herself injured. The railroad set up negligence on the part of
the plaintiff. The jury found that the plaintiff was not negligent. The
Circuit Court of Appeals examined the evidence-all of which had been
sent up on an exception taken to the court's overruling defendant's motion
for judgment notwithstanding verdict. No bill of exceptions had been
signed. Such a motion as defendant relied on was not known to the
common law.
Upon consulting the arguments of counsel (p. 598), it will be seen that
the point was raised that such re-examination by the Circuit Court of
Appeals was forbidden by the seventh amendment.
The Supreme Court of the United States, it appears, took up the
evidence, examined it and came to their own conclusion with regard to
the fact whether the plaintiff was negligent. "The view which we take of
the evidence examined by the Circuit Court of Appeals." Per Van
Devanter, J. (p. 604.)
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To allow the whole evidence to be certified, upon an exception
that the testimony adduced by the plaintiff does not warrant a
recovery, was a practice, we say, unknown to the common law.
In every such instance, unless the defendant demurred to the
evidence, upon which the case was withdrawn from the jury,
the plaintiff had a right to go to the jury, no matter how slight
was his chance of obtaining a verdict. For an appellate court
to re-examine the whole evidence, except as brought before
them upon a demurrer to evidence, was a thing unheard of, under
the rules of the common law existing at the time of the adoption
of the seventh amendment.
Indeed, it may be said, without fear of contradiction, that such
an examination was just what the amendment was intended to
forbid. It forbade a bench of judges from passing upon evi-
dence that had once been submitted to a jury, and upon which
the jury had rendered their verdict.
It is apparent, therefore, that an appellate court of the United
States cannot re-examine a fact tried by a jury below, unless
the record reaches them in conformity with the rules of the com-
mon law of that period. In other words, it is the form of the
record that determines whether the appellate court shall have a
right to look into the facts tried by a jury.
The Circuit Court of Appeals to-day have'the same right, to
re-examine a fact tried by a jury, that the appellate courts of
England and America were exercising under the common law
rules in 1791, but no greater right. The reader may turn to a
dictum pronounced by that eminent lawyer, Mr. Justice
Matthews, in dealing with this subject'3-0  He is speaking of
the special and general terms of the Supreme Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, which he declares to be terms of one and the
same court. The justice observes:
"In some of the States . . . a writ of error is
authorized to bring up for review the proceedings and
judgment of an inferior court on which it may be assigned
as an error in law on a bill of exceptions setting forth the
whole evidence that the court below erred in not granting
a new trial because the verdict was against the evidence.
Such a practice in the appellate courts of the United States
is perhaps forbidden by the seventh amendment to the
Constitution of the United States declaring that 'no fact
tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any
"Metropolitan R. R. Co. v. Moore (886), 121 U. S. 573.
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court of the United States than according to the rules of"
the common law.'
Prohibiting a re-examination we see, therefore, was a means
adopted by the framers of the amendment in order to preserve
the right of a trial by jury. Apt words are employed in order
to give lasting effect to this inhibition. Of course, the rules of
the common law at that period were definite and fixed. No sub-
sequent change in practice in the State courts could authorize a
court of the United States to alter in the slightest degree a pro-
cedure which always had been followed as one which accorded
with the rules of the common law.
An appellate court of the United States, we repeat, may not
in any other way than by a bill of exceptions re-examine the
ultimate fact tried by a jury,--the fact which a jury by their ver-
dict have authorized the court to put upon record. Since the
rules of the common law knew of no such practice as bringing
up the entire evidence on a bill of exceptions, a Circuit Court of
Appeals has no right to re-examine the evidence in order to
ascertain whether the trial court was right, or not, in sustaining
a defendant's request for instructing the jury to find a verdict
for the defendant.
Let us now turn for a moment to the subject of demurrer to
evidence and ascertain, if we may, what right, if any, a trial
court has to direct a verdict.
Says Blackstone (III, p. 373):
"A demurrer to the evidence shall be determined by
the court out of which the record is sent. This happens
where a record of other matter is produced in evidence,
concerning the legal consequences of which there arises a
doubt in law; in which case the adverse party may, if he
pleases, demur to the whole evidence, which admits the
truth of every fact that has been alleged, but denies the
sufficiency of them all in point of law to maintain or over-
throw the issue; which draws the question of law from
the cognizance of the jury, to be decided (as it ought)
by the Court."
To demur to the evidence was to take a great risk. Still, it
was the only way open for a defendant to have the case with-
drawn from the jury in a trial court of the United States, since
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a peremptory nonsuit, according to the early decisions, would not
be ordered against the will of the plaintiff.1
Buller's Nisi Prius, published before 1776, treats of bills of
exceptions and demurrers to evidence. In Conkling's Treatise
on Practice in United States Courts (1842) are to be found the
Rules of Practice of the District Court for the Northern District
of New York. Rule 50 reads as follows:
"In cases of exceptions taken, demurrer to evidence,
or special verdict, the party shall not be required to pre-
pare at the trial his bill of exceptions, demurrer, state-
ment of evidence, or special case, or to put in form the
special verdict, but, etc." (Page 542.)
If we turn to Colby's (Massachusetts) Practice (1848) we
may read at page 242:
"Where the evidence on the part of the plaintiff is all
introduced, if the defendant's counsel are of the opinion
that, in point of law, the plaintiff cannot recover, he may
demur to the evidence. But this course has now become
nearly obsolete, and can seldom be adopted with safety,
since such a demurrer admits not only all the facts directly
stated in it, but also all the facts which the evidence
legally tends in any degree to prove."'12
No recent writer, it will be agreed, has thrown light upon the
growth of th~e Trial by Jury with results more informing than
has the late James Bradley Thayer, of the Harvard Law School.
His chapter on "Law and Fact in Jury Trials," in "A Pre-
liminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law" (1898), is
worthy of the closest examination. Of demurrers to evidence,
Professor Thayer remarks:
"They had the effect to withdraw from the jury all
consideration of the facts and in their pure form to sub-
mit to the court two questions, of which only the second
was, in strictness, a question of law; namely, whether a
verdict for the party who gave the evidence could be
given (a) as a matter of legitimate inference from the
evidence; (b) as a matter of law. Of this expedient I
do not observe any mention earlier than the year 1456.
"Near the end of the last century demurrers upon evi-
dence got their death blow in England, by the decision in
"Ehnore v. Grymes, (1828) I Pet. 469. Compare remarks of Gray, J.,
in Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman Car Co. (89o), 139 U. S. 39.
Copeland v. N. E. Ins. Co., 22 Pick. 135.
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the case of Gibson v. Hunter, carrying down with it also
the great case of Lickbarrow v. Mason, which, like the
former, had come up to the Lords upon such a demurrer.
It was there held that in cases of complication, or uncer-
tainty in the evidence, the party demurring must specify
upon the record the facts which he admits."'1
Gibson v. Hunter'4 was decided in 1793. Enough has been
said to make it apparent that at the time of the adoption of the
seventh amendment, a defendant who deemed the evidence sub-
mitted by the plaintiff insufficient, could demur if he chose;
otherwise, the evidence went to the jury. As we have already
observed, there was no such practice known at that time as
directing a verdict.
In confirmation of this statement the following extracts are
quoted from writers conversant with the facts:
An editorial note in the May, 19o3, number of the Harvard
Law Review, on "Limitations on Power of Court to Direct Ver-
dict," speaking of State constitutions and the right to trial by
jury, says:
"Though the practice of granting new trials may be
supported on the ground that it existed at the time the
constitutional provisions were adopted, the present prac-
tice of directing verdicts having grown up in the last half
century cannot be regarded as impliedly recognized by the
constitutions."' 5
We read in Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice,8 "That
the practice of directing the verdict was a departure from
earlier usage, and was of slow development, is apparent from
some of the earlier American authorities."
Mr. Hughes, author of a work upon Federal Procedure
(i9o4), says: "In the Virginia practice, which probably is
similar to that of many States, such a thing as directing a verdict
is unheard of. The only method of taking advantage of the
failure of the plaintiff to prove his case is by demurrer to evi-
dence with all its attendant risks." (Page 367.)
In the opinion of Mr. Justice Clifford in Improvement Com-
pany v. Munson,17 this language occurs:
" Pages 2.34-5.
142 H. B1. 137.
"I6 Harv. L. R. 515.
"Vol. iv, p. 673.
17 14 Wall. 448.
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"Formerly it was held that if there was what was called
a scintilla of evidence in support of a case the judge was
bound to leave it to the jury, but recent decisions of high
authority have established a more reasonable rule, that in
every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there
is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there
is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon
which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for
the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is
imposed."
The words are those of Lord Chelmsford, in Giblin v. McMul-
len, 2 Priv. Counc. App. 37. Of the "recent decisions," that
chiefly relied on is Ryder v. Wombwell, L. R. 4 Exch. 39, decided
in 1868. Not one of the cases cited by Clifford, J., it seems, was
decided earlier than 1853.
We are now in a position to inquire how the practice of direct-
ing a verdict managed to gain a foothold in trial courts of the
United States. Thought of any restriction upon appellate courts
of the United States imposed by the seventh amendment could
hardly have been present in the judicial mind when approval was
given to what at the time seemed to be a desirable change in the
method of trying an action at law.
It seems that as late as the October Term, 1877, of the
Supreme Court of the United States, in a case where all the
evidence had been set out in a bill of exceptions, it was alleged as
error that the judge below had directed the jury to find a verdict
for the defendants. The Court sustained the ruling, and
affirmed the judgment."'
"We decided in Improvement Co. v. Munson (14 Wall.
442) and Pleasants v. Fant (22 id. 116), that although
there may be some evidence in favor of a party, yet if it
is insufficient to sustain a verdict, so that one based
thereon would be set aside, the court is not bound to sub-
mit the case to the jury, but may direct them what verdict
to render. As the question is fully discussed in those
cases, it is unnecessary to repeat the discussion here."
Per Bradley, J.
The former case cited was decided at the December Term,
1871; while Miller, J., delivered the opinion in Pleasants v.
Fant at the October Term, 1874. It is to be observed that Mr.
Justice Bradley declares that the court decided in these cases
"
8Herbert v. Butler, 97 U. S. 319, 320.
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that the trial judge "is not bound to submit the case to the
jury." If the case is not submitted to the jury, the inquiry is
pertinent, who is it that determines the issue? Not the jury.
The case has not been submitted to them.
Yet we read, upon the heels of this phraseology, that the judge
may direct the jury what verdict to render. So the jury do
determine the issue after all. It is the jury that "brings in" the
verdict, though as a matter of fact they may not have left their
seats. In order that we may learn upon what grounds the
Supreme Court of the United States have based the right of a
trial judge of a United States court to direct a verdict, let us
look at the reasoning to be found in the two cases cited by
Bradley, J.
Pleasants v. Fant, supra, presented but a single question. It
was whether the defendant was a partner. Both plaintiff and
defendant prayed instructions. The Court refused them, and
said to the jury:
"There is no evidence in this cause from which the
jury can find that the defendant had such an interest
as will make him, the defendant, a partner as
to third persons, and the jury will, therefore, find their
verdict for defendant." (p. 116.)
Plaintiffs in error argued:
"That a circuit court has no authority to order a per-
emptory nonsuit against the plaintiff's will. But very
nearly the same result is reached if after a plaintiff has
given what he deems sufficient evidence of his case, and
which does confessedly tend to prove it, the Court may
tell the jury what this Court told the jury below.
The Court (Miller, J.) examines the testimony as to partner-
ship and says:
"We are pressed with the proposition that it was for
the jury to decide this question, because the testimony
received and offered had some tendency to establish a
participation in the profits, and the question of liability
under such circumstances should have been submitted to
them, with such declarations of what constitutes a part-
nership as would enable them to decide correctly.
"No doubt there are decisions to be found which go a
long way to hold that if there is the slightest tendency in
any part of the evidence to support the plaintiff's case it
must be submitted to the jury; and in the present case,
if the Court had so submitted it, with proper instructions,
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it would be difficult to say that it would have been error
of which the defendant could have complained here."
(Page i2o.)19
Here one notes a recognition of what was formerly known as
the doctrine of "scintilla of evidence" which, as we have seen,
had at one time a foothold in England. (Consult Thompson on
Trials, Sect. 2247.) We are apprised of the circumstance that
directing a verdict is a modem practice, both in American and in
English courts. The opinion continues:
"But as was said by this Court in the case of The
Improvement Co. v. Munson (14 Wall. 448), recent
decisions of a high authority have established a more rea-
sonable rule, that in every case before the evidence is left
to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge,
not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether
there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed to
find a verdict for the party producing it upon whom the
onus of proof is imposed.
"The English cases there cited fully sustain the proposi-
tion (Jewell v. Parr, 13 C. B. 916; Toomey v. L. & B.
Railway Co., 3 C. B. (N. S.) 146; Ryder v. Wombwell,
4 L. R., 4 Exch. 33), and the decisions of this Court have
generally been to the same effect." (p. I2O.)
Lord Chelmsford's language about "recent decisions" is
repeated, the reader will perceive, as appropriated by Clifford, J.
" The utterances of Mr. Justice Miller, wherever made, are listened to
with profound respect. It is interesting to note what he says in an
article, published thirteen years later, as to the fixed character of the
practice required by this amendment.
"The principle that a fact once tried by a jury shall be final
and conclusive between the parties, and shall not be otherwise re-
examined in any court of the United States than according to
the rules of the common law, has been held to mean that a verdict
of a jury upon the facts of a case is not only conclusive in that
court, but in all other courts where the same question of fact may
come in controversy between the same parties; and that a re-
examination, according to the course of the common law referred
to in that article, is on a motion for a new trial in the same court,
where" the verdict may be set aside, or by a writ of error to some
court which has appellate jurisdiction over the court in which
the trial took place. It is therefore to be seen that the trial by
jury in the Federal courts, in almost all of its original English
features, and perhaps beyond those, has been fixed upon the judicial
system of the United States with the utmost rigidity. Nothing short
of constitutional amendments can affect in any very important matter
this system."
The System of Trial by Jury, by Samuel F. Miller (I887), 21 Am.
Law Review, 86o.
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We discover it to be the English practice, which the Supreme
Court is here approving.
Mr. Justice Miller then proceeds to cite three cases decided by
the Supreme Court, which, according to his reasoning, sustain
the "proposition" that it is "a more reasonable rule" for the
judge to decide the preliminary question, whether the jury "can
properly proceed to find a verdict, etc." He cites Parks v. Ross,
(i85o), 1i How.. 362, where the defendant asked at the close of
the plaintiff's testimony, that the court instruct the jury "if the
evidence is believed by the jury to be true, the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover." Grier, J., delivered the opinion in that case,
sustaining the ruling of the trial judge. It seems that the
Supreme Court examined "the admitted facts," and found that
there was "no evidence whatever tending to show that Ross had
contracted personally to pay." (p. 374.)
"In the case of Parks v. Ross," says Mr. Justice Miller,
"this court held that the practice of granting an instruc-
tion like the present had superseded the ancient practice
of demurrer to evidence, and that it answered the same
purpose and should be tested by the same rules; and in
that case it said -the question for the consideration of the
court was whether the evidence submitted was sufficient
to authorize the jury in finding the contract set up by
plaintiff. And in Schuchardt v. Allen (i Wall. 359) this
case is referred to as establishing the doctrine that if the
evidence be not sufficient to warrant a recovery, it is the
duty of the Court to instruct the jury accordingly." (p.
21.)
The case of Pawling v. United States (4 Cranch, 219) is cited
as indicating a correct view of the doctrine of a demurrer to
evidence.
Of directing a verdict, Grier, J., says that it "has in many
States superseded the ancient practice of a demurrer to evi-
dence." The federal court is plainly seen here to be following
the State practice, as being a new and more convenient mode of
procedure.
We discover, therefore, that it is the decision in Parks v. Ross
which furnishes the ground for sustaining the practice of direct-
ing a verdict. But counsel in Parks v. Ross did not raise the
point that the seventh amendment prohibits such a practice as
directing a verdict. Nor has it elsewhere been raised, that we
can discover. No court has ventured to express its views as to
the application of the inhibitions of the amendment, for the very
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good reason, we presume, that no court has ever been asked so
to do. The question therefore, it would seem, remains open for
determination.
In Pleasants v. Fant, the Court say:
"We hold the true principle to be, that if the Court is
satisfied that, conceding all the inferences which the jury
could justifiably draw from the testimony, the evidence
is insufficient to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff, the
Court should say so to the jury." (p. 122.)
A review of these decisions shows that the Court apparently
did not take into consideration what effect, if any, the language
of the amendment under review could have had upon the question
of the legality of this new departure from a long settled practice.
It seems to have been assumed that the customary application of
the rules of the common law had been in no wise disturbed. At
all events, nothing is said in the opinion about common law rules.
One readily admits that the growth of the country, the changes
wrought in methods of business, particularly the advent of cor-
porations with the constantly increasing crop of suits for
damages brought against them, have made it desirable that
actions wherein the evidence is scanty be disposed of by a method
more speedy than that which is afforded by the old-fashioned
demurrer to evidence. Several States (and a State is not
hampered in this respect by constitutional restrictions) have
adopted the practice of directing a verdict. So far as tested in
the federal courts, it would seem that the new method in the
main has worked out substantial justice. The question here,
however, is not,--Does the new departure work well? What is
asked is,--Can it be maintained in the face of the prohibitive
terms of the seventh amendment?
The view expressed by Lord Chelmsford, and approved, as we
have seen, by the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of
the United States-
" . .that in every case before the evidence is
left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for thejudge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but
whether there is any upon which a jury can properly pro-
ceed to find a verdict,"
in itself embodies nothing new; but it demands a critical exami-
nation, since it has been accepted as the foundation for a depar-
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ture in the Federal courts from the practice established under the
rules of the common law. Before we enquire, however, into the
circumstances of its application, a single word may properly be
said as to a possible objection that directing a verdict is depriving
a party of his right to trial by jury.
Certain decisions of State courts hold that to direct a verdict
is not to deprive the losing party of his right to a trial by jury.
The reasoning substantially is that trial by jury is designed to
determine only questions of fact which are disputed. Where
the evidence is "all one way," there is nothing, it is said, for the
jury to decide.
For example, a jury are told to find for the defendant. They
do so. They do not weigh the evidence, or draw inferences from
it. The judge has spared them the trouble. They simply regis-
ter a conclusion, which the judge has reached. Thus time is
saved. Surely this looks harmless enough.
And yet it is a line of reasoning which provokes one to cast
about to determine whether in truth it be sound. But, for the
present at least, it is enough to say that decisions of State courts
in this field are of no great importance to our present enquiry,
for the reason that State courts (with the single exception, we
believe, of West Virginia) are not brought under the prohibitive
terms of the seventh amendment in regard to a re-examination,
etc.2 0
The doctrine of "preliminary question,"-that is, whether
there be any evidence upon which a jury can properly find a
verdict for the plaintiff,-and submitting this question to the
jury under instructions to find for defendant, is as we have seen
of an origin comparatively recent. It was not known to the
common law. Such a question at the time the seventh amend-
ment went into effect formed the subject of a demurrer to evi-
dence.
This preliminary question has been termed a "question of
law." The expression "question of law" must be taken at its
proper meaning. A question for the court may well enough be
called "a question of law," in order to distinguish it from a
question of fact that" goes to the jury. But an analysis of the
enquiry whether there be any evidence to warrant the finding of
a verdict, will discover that such an enquiry is really a question
of fact, precisely as is the regularly recurring question which the
"' See remarks of Snyder, J., 1885, in Barlow v. Daniels, 25 W. Va. 514.
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jury take with them to the jury-room, namely, Does the evidence,
together with the inferences to be drawn therefrom, satisfy us
that the plaintiff has proved his case?
The question raised on demurrer to the evidence,-Is there
any evidence to warrant a verdict ?-is nothing more nor less
than a question of fact. To answer it requires no special knowl-
edge of legal principles. It naturally enough came to be
entrusted to the trial judge, because of his experience. That it
was to be decided by him, and not by the jury, invested it with
the character of a question of law. "They called it" a question
of law. In other words, it became a question for the court.
And yet, the trial judge, in answering it, went through identically
the same process that a juryman does in settling such questions
of fact as are presented to him in the process of reaching the
ultimate fact, i.e., the verdict.
Proof that this preliminary question is one of fact is afforded
from the circumstance that, under the practice which we are
reviewing, it is consigned to the jury to answer. True, they
answer it under an instruction how they shall find their ver-
dict. Nevertheless the jury do, in contemplation of law, ask
themselves the question, for example,-Is there any evidence
upon which a verdict for the plaintiff can be found? When a
jury is directed to render a verdict for the defendant, they first
find as a fact that, upon the whole evidence, the plaintiff cannot
recover. They find precisely the same fact that the trial judge
used to find in disposing of a demurrer to evidence. This result
they reach by taking the identical steps that he did. So far as
the mental process of reaching a conclusion is concerned, the
two methods are one and the same thing.
Continuing in this line of thought, let us see what a jury act-
ually do in rendering a verdict under direction. We sometimes
encounter an argument, advanced by one who elsewhere proves
himself an acute reasoner, that a jury who render a verdict
because directed so to do are really deciding no fact, since there
is no fact in issue to decide. The evidence is undisputed; and
no issue of fact therefore has been left open for the jury to pass
upon.
The reasoning is fallacious. He who propounds it leaves out
of the reckoning altogether the factor that a verdict settles upon
the record the chief question in issue, namely, whether the
defendant owes the plaintiff, or (if the action be in tort)
whether the defendant has damaged the plaintiff. In fact, it is
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impossible to conceive of a jury, in an action of contract, finding
for the defendant without thereby asserting that they "find the
truth to be," that the defendant does -not owe the plaintiff as
alleged.
Or, to speak in different terms of their discharge of duty, the
common law looked upon the jury as free to act of their own
motion in respect to drawing inferences from the evidence, sub-
ject only to instructions from the court as to the law applicable
to this or that state of facts, if it shall be found by them to be
true. The rules of the common law either withheld the evidence
from the jury under the form of a demurrer, or entrusted it to
them untrammelled by direction as to which party they should
find for, save as the law applicable to this or that fact, which
they might find to be true, would serve as their guide.
When one asserts that the common law knew no such practice
as that of directing a verdict, the meaning is obvious. It is only
another way of asserting that the office of a jury is not to register
a verdict, prepared for them by the presiding judge, but to take
the evidence into consideration, retire, and upon comparison of
views reach a conclusion of fact (if they can agree), which they
put into the shape of a verdict.
Courts in some instances, when passing upon a question of the
functions of the jury, appear to have overlooked the duty and the
right of a jury to find from the evidence the ultimate fact, which
takes the form of a verdict. The theory is not a sound one that
the sole occasion for a jury to act is when a disputed question of
fact as to the meaning of the evidence is presented. The evi-
dence may be undisputed, but the question of fact remains, Is
the plaintiff's claim proved?
Upon this topic, Professor Thayer discourses with his cus-
tomary acuteness.
"We are not then to suppose," he says, "that a jury
has found all the facts merely because it has found all
that is needed as a basis for the operation of the reason-
ing faculty; the right inference or conclusion in point of
fact, is itself matter of fact, and to be ascertained by the
jury. As regards reasoning, the judges have no exclusive
office; the jury must also perform it at almost every
step.'"21
It is not the common law conception of a jury that they per-
form their duty at times by simply registering an order of the
Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, p. 194.
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judge, who, upon a view of the evidence, tells them what they
are to do,--what verdict they are to render.
Professor Thayer cites the following as a note to what has
just been quoted:
"It is not because facts are admitted that it is therefore
for the judge to say what the decision upon them should
be. If the facts which are admitted are capable of two
equally possible views, which reasonable people may take,
and one of them is more consistent with the case for one
party than for the other, it is the duty of the judge to
let the jury decide between such conflicting views."
Bowen, L. J., in Davey v. London & S. W. Railway Co.,
12 Q. B. D. 70, 76. In citing this passage with approval,
Williams, J., in Pearce v. Landowne, 69 L. T. Rep. 316,
said: 'I do not believe that because the facts are admitted
the functions of the jury as to drawing inferences from
them are altered at all.'"
The question then demands an answer-Does directing a ver-
dict in a trial court of the United States deprive a party of his
right to a trial by jury within the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution? We have found it impossible
to escape the conviction that logically such a practice does work
out this deprivation. The same answer must be given to-day
that would have been given had the question been asked soon
after the amendment went into effect in 1791.22
In the earlier day, when a defendant thought that the testi-
mony presented by the plaintiff was not sufficient to entitle the
plaintiff to a verdict, he could demur to the evidence. He was
obliged either to do that, or to take his chances with the jury.
In the old common law practice, when there was demurrer to
evidence, the judge ordered the associate to take a note of the
'We would not have the reader imagine that we are in the least degree
lacking in sympathy with the movement already begun for expediting,
in the federal courts, the trial of causes. We find ourselves in full
accord with every proposal that looks to a simpler and a more speedy
procedure. We have brought forward the question of constitutionality
for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not it be an obstacle to certain
reforms in practice, taken by the court itself. If the power to direct a
verdict actually exists, the point of unconstitutionality must be pronounced
to be without merit. If, however, it shall be discovered that the injunc-
tion of the Constitution does stand in the way of legally providing thus
for a speedier disposition of business, then a first step towards a remedy
will have been taken.
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testimony, and that was signed by the counsel on both sides and
the demurrer affixed to the postea. (Buller's Nisi Prius, p. 307.)
Upon a rejoinder, the jury were discharged. Sometimes they
found the amount of damages subject to the decision on the
demurrer.
It will be seen that the question presented is that of fact; but
because of its being withdrawn from the jury, and laid before
the court, it is regarded as "a question of law." It is the form
and manner of its decision that gives to it this name.
A cardinal rule in preparing a demurrer is that it is the fact
which is to be put on record, not the testimony to prove the
fact. The party demurring admits the facts, and all inferences
properly to be drawn from them. The great risk run by the
party who demurs is that "he confesses all the facts which the
evidence, directly or indirectly, tends to prove." Elliott's Gen-
eral Practice, sec. 872.23
"A demurrer to evidence should state facts, and not
the evidence which tends to prove those facts; and when
the evidence is oral, and merely tends to prove or dis-
prove some important fact, or facts, in issue, the demurrer
should not set out the evidence, but the fact or facts which
it tends to establish." (Per Mulkey, J., 92 Ill. 237 (1879),
Crowe v. The People.)
As we have already seen, Mr. Justice Grier says of the prac-
tice of directing a verdict, "It has superseded the ancient
'By the rules of the common law such a determination of fact
expressed upon the record as having been reached upon the whole
evidence, was required to be brought into the appellate court upon writ
of error, in no other way than by exception to a judgment sustaining a
demurrer to evidence. In such a demurrer defendant must have admitted
the facts presented by the plaintiff, and not merely the evidence from
which the existence of the facts is inferable. It was only because the
facts had thus been admitted, and entered upon the record, that the jury
were not called upon to find them from the evidence, as well as to find
the ultimate fact in the shape of their verdict.
As has already been remarked, the rules of the common law knew
of no such practice as that of bringing all the testimony in a law case,
verbatim, in the form of questions and answers up to an appellate
court. Had it been proposed, in the early days, to take this step, it would
not for a moment have been tolerated, because it virtually allows a bench
ot judges to try the case all over again on the facts.
. . . It is certainly not an attribute of that writ, according to
common law doctrine, to submit the testimony as well as the law of
the case to the revision of this Court."
Per Mr. Justice Johnson, Parsons v. Armor (183o), 3 Pet. 425.
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practice of a demurrer to evidence. It answers the same pur-
pose, and should be tested by the same rules." In explanation of
what is meant, the opinion continues:
"A demurrer to evidence admits not only the facts
stated therein, but also every conclusion which a jury
might fairly or reasonably infer therefrom."
If by the expression "tested by the same rules" the learned
Justice would have it understood that a trial judge bestows the
same quantum of time and attention upon the meaning of the
facts, in directing a verdict that he does in deciding a demurrer
to evidence, the statement is obviously incorrect. The two
methods in their practical operation differ in important
particulars.
Says an approved writer on Practice:
"There is a difference between demurring to the evi-
dence and moving the Court to direct a verdict, for until
the direction is given the case is not withdrawn from thejury, whereas in the case of a demurrer to the evidence,
and a joinder, there is a complete withdrawal by the acts
of the parties themselves. It may be true that the Court
may, for cause shown, permit the case to go to the jury
after the joinder in demurrer, but upon principle the par-
ties cannot as a matter of right demand that it shall be
submitted to the jury."
Elliott's General Practice (1894), sec. 865.
We need not enlarge upon the topic of the difference between
these two modes of disposing of a plaintiff's evidence. Demur-
ring to evidence was the subject of examination by the Supreme
Court of the United States, in a recent case. That directing a
verdict is by no means identical with demurring to evidence is
plainly pointed out by the Justice delivering the opinion.2 4
24
"In what has been said we would not be understood as implying that
a motion for a compulsory nonsuit and a demurrer to the evidence are
equivalents of a request for a directed verdict, for while they are some-
times spoken of as analogous to it, this only means that for the purpose
of each the evidence must be taken most strongly in favor of the oppo-
site party. In other respects they are essentially unlike. A motion for a
compulsory nonsuit looks to an arrest of the trial and a dismissal of
the cause, leaving the merits undetermined and the plaintiff free to sue
again, while a request for a directed verdict looks to a completion of the
trial and adjudication of the merits through the accustomed co6peration
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A plaintiff enjoys an advantage under the common law rules
governing a demurrer to evidence. The advantage is an inci-
dent of the general rule which sends to the jury every question
of fact, and which views with scant favor the entrusting of a
decision of fact to the trial judge.
Experience may have satisfied us that our fathers were unduly
concerned as to the danger of permitting a question of fact to be
determined by the judge presiding at a trial. Although this be
true; nevertheless the rule which they ordained stands, until the
Constitution shall be further amended.
FRANK WARREN HACKETT.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
of the court and jury. Full recognition of this, as also of its bearing
here, is found in Oscanyan v. Arms Co., i03 U. S. 261, 264, where it is
said: 'The difference in the two modes is rather a matter of form than
of substance, except in the case of a nonsuit a new action may be brought,
whereas in the case of a verdict the action is ended, unless a new trial
be granted either upon motion or upon appeal.
"Equally pronounced is the difference between a demurrer to the evi-
dence and a request for a directed verdict; for if on such a demurrer,
properly joined in and allowed, judgment is not given for the demurrant,
it is necessarily given for his opponent, while if a request for a directed
verdict is denied the party making the request may yet receive the
jury's verdict and a judgment thereon. And when a judgment on a
demurrer to the evidence is reversed because given for the wrong party,
the error is corrected by ordering a judgment for the other party, whereas
when a judgment is reversed for error in granting or refusing a request
to direct a verdict, judgment is not ordered for either party, but a new
trial is awarded.'
Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S. 394, Per Van Devanter, J.,
speaking for the majority of the Court.
